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Structures, homomorphisms, and the
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PETER MILNE
Abstract: When we look closely at textbooks on model theory, we find
that there are three different accounts of what a model or structure is. One
of these is highly language dependent, so that the same structure cannot
be the interpretation of two different languages or signatures. The other two
definitions do not fall foul of that dependence but all textbooks tie the notion
of homomorphism so closely to language (signature) that only structures
interpreting the same language (signature) are isomorphic. Although this
follows the practice in universal algebra, it is highly unnatural. The aim
here is to present a notion of homomorphism better consonant with intuition
and with what the less cautious authors of textbooks say when they speak
informally.
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1 Introduction
There is an informal notion of a structure which one finds in many texts on
model theory, a notion borrowed from algebra. There is also, in many, a for-
mal notion supposedly motivated by the informal one. Depending on which
text one reads, these two notions may not match up: it depends on the way
in which the formal notion involves a language.1 To see what I’m getting
at, begin by considering Wilfrid Hodges’ characterization of contemporary
practice in model theory:
Model theorists are forever talking about symbols, names, and
labels. A group theorist will happily write the same abelian
group multiplicatively or additively, whichever is more conve-
nient for the matter in hand. Not so the model theorist: for him
1In some texts, such as the classic Model Theory (Chang & Keisler, 1990), ‘structure’ is
used only informally and does not appear in the index; on the other hand, ‘model’ is used both
formally and informally.
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or her the group with ‘·’ is one structure and the group with ‘+’
is a different structure. Change the name and you change the
structure. (Hodges, 1993, p. 1; Hodges, 1997, p. 1)2
If we read this literally, it has an odd consequence, for many of the texts in
model theory published in English over the past fifteen years or so started
life in other languages: (Manzano, 1999), Spanish; (Poizat, 2000), French;
(Rothmaler, 2000), (Prestel & Delzell, 2011), German; (Tent & Ziegler,
2012), has its origin in lecture notes in German; (Marcja & Toffalori, 2003)
is not a literal translation but has some overlap with (Marcja & Toffalori,
1998). So many languages—so many different structures? However odd
that may seem, on closer inspection of what these and other authors say,
we find that there are in practice three different accounts of what a model-
theoretic structure (or model) is.
Hodges continues,
This must look like pedantry. [. . . ] Nevertheless there are sev-
eral good reasons why model theorists take the view that they
do. [. . . ]
In the first place, we often want to compare two structures
and to study the homomorphisms from one to the other. What
is a homomorphism? [. . . A] homomorphism from structure A
to structure B is a map which carries each operation of A to
the operation with the same name in B. (Hodges, 1993, p. 1;
Hodges, 1997, p. 1; emphasis in the originals)
It is an immediate and surely unwanted—and, I think, largely
unrecognised—consequence of what Hodges tells us here that where the
algebraist sees only one group Hodges’ model theorist must see two non-
isomorphic groups. But worse is to come. Even those authors who can
readily agree with the algebraist that there is only one structure give the lan-
guage (or the signature) used in the specification of a structure such a role in
the definition of homomorphism that structures specified using different lan-
guages/signatures simply cannot be isomorphic! We have, then, an unhappy
situation: either we have (i) a notion of structure compatible with the notion
of homomorphism but which renders structure so parochial that the same
model theorist speaking in different languages cannot, by her own lights, be
speaking of the same structures, or we have (ii) a notion of structure conso-
nant with common sense and a notion of homomorphism so parochial that
2(Hodges, 1997) takes a lot of material unchanged from (Hodges, 1993).
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what should count as the same model specified in different languages has to
be seen as a family of necessarily non-isomorphic models.
The definition of homomorphism that we find in (Hodges, 1993, 1997),
(Poizat, 2000), (Rothmaler, 2000), (Marker, 2002), (Marcja & Toffalori,
2003), (Prestel & Delzell, 2011), (Tent & Ziegler, 2012) takes homomor-
phisms to be defined only between structures with a common signature. De-
spite this, Hodges says that it ‘is meant to take in, with one grand sweep
of the arm, virtually all the things that are called “homomorphism” in any
branch of algebra’! And truth to tell, textbooks in universal algebra con-
form. But intuitively the notions of homomorphism and isomorphism that
these authors arrive at fall far short of the mark. Indeed, going by the letter
of the definitions of structure and homorphism they offer, we can have lan-
guages interpreted in the same domain with the same distinguished individ-
uals, functions and relations but the resulting structures are not isomorphic
exactly because no allowance for difference of language is made in the defi-
nition of homomorphism. Authors who do not tie structures to languages—
e.g., Bell and Slomson (1969), Sacks (1972), Manzano (1999)—do no bet-
ter, for they too, as we’ll see, tie homomorphisms to signatures (similarity
types).
My aims are twofold: to tease out the various notions of structure in
the textbooks and, rather more importantly, to arrive at a notion of homo-
morphism compatible with the less parochial reading of structure. For help
in this, I turn to Joseph Goguen and Rod Burstall’s theory of institutions
(Goguen & Burstall, 1992); here we find a stepping-stone towards a defini-
tion of homomorphism between structures that better matches what the less
cautious of our authors say when they speak informally. (Though the morals
drawn have wider application, I shall, as is common in textbook presenta-
tions of model theory, confine attention to the model theory of first-order
languages.)
2 What is model theory?
Let us begin by taking a look at what some texts on model theory say model
theory is. In J. L. Bell and A. B. Slomson’s Models and Ultraproducts
(1969) we find
Model theory . . . can be described briefly as the study of the
relationship between formal languages and abstract structures.
(Bell & Slomson, 1969, p. 1)
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David Marker, Model Theory: An Introduction (2002):
Model theory is a branch of mathematical logic where we study
mathematical structures by considering the first-order sentences
true in those structures and the sets definable by first-order for-
mulas. (Marker, 2002, p. 1)
Annalisa Marcja and Carlo Toffalori, A Guide to Classical and Modern
Model Theory (2003):
Model Theory is—or, more precisely, was at its beginning—the
study of the relationship between mathematical formulas and
structures satisfying or rejecting them. (Marcja & Toffalori,
2003, p. 1)
I fully expect that you find nothing controversial in these claims. What
I want to point to here is that they are naturally read as agreeing with what
Bell and Slomson say explicitly:
In ch. 3 we described the language L of predicate calculus with
equality and then we looked at interpretations, i.e. realizations,
of this language. In this chapter and for most of the rest of this
book we are going to look at things the other way round. We re-
gard relational structures as the objects of primary interest and
we introduce a first order predicate language in order to be able
to say things about them. This is the most natural viewpoint in
mathematics; it is the structures that present themselves first.
(Bell & Slomson, 1969, p. 72, my emphasis)
As Gerald Sacks says pithily, ‘The “objects” of model theory are the
structures’ (Sacks, 1972, p. 10). On the face of it, this is all very much at
odds with what we saw Hodges saying.
Now, I certainly do not claim that there is conceptual confusion, far less
error, in the actual day-to-day practice of model theory. But there are is-
sues concerning basic notions, issues which become especially pressing if
one thinks of model theory as providing a paradigm for semantics. That
the identity of what we talk about be in part determined by the language
in which we talk, for example, would render translation impossible, as it
might seem to be, on Hodges’ characterization, in the case of our model
theory textbooks, for we cannot refer in one language to what we speak of
in another.
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3 Structures in the intuitive sense
Let’s take a quick look at what some of the textbooks say about structures.
Chang and Keisler begin Model Theory by saying
Let us now take a short introductory tour of model theory. We
begin with the models which are structures of the kind that
arise in mathematics. For example, the cyclic group of order
5, the field of rational numbers, and the partially-ordered struc-
ture consisting of all sets of integers ordered by inclusion, are
models of the kind we consider. (Chang & Keisler, 1990, p. 1)
In similar fashion, in his chapter on first-order logic in the model theory sec-
tion of the Handbook of Mathematical Logic, Jon Barwise gives us groups,
a group being a triple 〈G,+, 0〉 satisfying certain conditions, namely asso-
ciativity of the operation +, the existence of an identity, 0, for +, and the
existence of inverses with respect to + and the identity, and the ordered
field R = 〈R,+, ·, <, 0, 1〉 of real numbers among other examples (Bar-
wise, 1977, pp. 7-8, 11).
Philipp Rothmaler (Introduction to Model Theory, 2000) offers
By specifying certain neutral elements and operations, we may
view the set Z of integers as an additive group, as a multiplica-
tive semigroup, or as a ring. [. . . ] We could also add the inverse
operation − or the ordering relation <. (Rothmaler, 2000, p. 3)
Marker says
Intuitively a structure is a set that we wish to study equipped
with a collection of distinguished functions, relations, and el-
ements. We then choose a language where we an talk about
the distinguished functions, relations, and elements and noth-
ing more. For example, when we study the ordered field of real
numbers with the exponential function, we study the structure
(R,+, ·, exp, <, 0, 1) where the underlying set is the set of real
numbers, and we distinguish the binary functions addition and
multiplication, the unary function x 7→ ex, the binary order re-
lation, and the numbers 0 and 1. To describe this structure we
could use a language where we have symbols for +, ·, exp, <,
0, 1 . . . .
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For another example, we might consider the structure
(N,+, 0, 1) of the natural numbers with addition and distin-
guished elements 0 and 1. The natural language for studying
this structure is the language where we have a binary function
symbol for addition and constant symbols for 0 and 1. (Marker,
2002, p. 7)
Marcja and Toffalori say,
Structures are an algebraic notion. [. . . ] What is a structure?
Basically, it is a non-empty set A, with a collection of distin-
guished elements, operations, and relations. For instance, the
set Z of integers with the usual operations of addition + and
multiplication · is a structure, as well as the same set Z with the
order relation ≤. Note that in these cases the underlying set is
the same (the integers), but, of course, the structure changes: in
the former case we have the ring of integers, in the latter the
integers as an ordered set. (Marcja & Toffalori, 2003, p. 1)
But some authors do follow Hodges’ line. Like Hodges, Bruno Poizat
(2000), Alexander Prestel and Charles Delzell (2011), and Katrin Tent and
Martin Ziegler (2012) are careful to spell out the language first when pre-
senting a structure—in flat out contradiction, it must be said, of what Bell
and Slomson called the most natural viewpoint in mathematics.
Hodges, however, rather gives the game away with one of his
examples—either that or he credits naming with magical power! He says:
Linear orderings Suppose ≤ linearly orders a set X . Then we
can make 〈X,≤〉 into a structure A as follows. The domain
of A is the set X . There is one binary relation symbol R, and
its interpretation RA is the ordering ≤. (Hodges, 1993, p. 3;
Hodges, 1997, p. 3)
For Hodges, going by what he says informally, the ordered pair 〈X,≤〉 is
not a structure, not, at least, for the model theorist—it might be for the
algebraist. We make it into one by taking a two-place relation symbol and
assigning ≤ as its interpretation. This gives rise to a bizarre profusion of
entities. Suppose you pick one relation symbol and I pick another—we now
have two structures where previously we had none. How many structures
built over 〈X,≤〉 are there? Hodges is, quite explicitly, not at all fussed
about what counts as a language.
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Aha—says the group theorist—I see you aren’t really talking
about written symbols at all. For the purposes you have de-
scribed, you only need to have formal labels for some parts of
your structures. It should be quite irrelevant what kinds of thing
your labels are; you might even want to have uncountably many
of them.
Quite right. In fact we shall follow the lead of A. I. Mal’tsev
(1936) and put no restrictions at all on what can serve as a name.
For example, any ordinal can be a name, and any mathemati-
cal object can serve as a name of itself. (Hodges, 1993, p. 2;
Hodges, 1997, p. 2)
Now, if that is right, 〈X,≤〉 is a structure with ≤ autonymously naming
itself and we are not needed to make it into one (which, to be fair, I don’t
really suppose Hodges thinks we are) and, assuming we aren’t really needed
to associate names and what they name, there are at least as many structures
built over 〈X,≤〉 as there are items in your favourite set-theoretic hierarchy.
And—the main point, to be developed below—they are all isomorphic in
a way that model-theorists do not capture with their definitions of isomor-
phism between structures!!!
4 Structures in the formal sense
Minor variations aside, there are three styles of definition for models or
structures in textbooks on model theory.
Definitions of the first kind: labelling (1) Let L comprise the non-
logical vocabulary of a first-order language. A model/interpretation/relat-
ional structure A for L is an ordered pair 〈A,I 〉, where
◦ A is a non-empty set;
◦ I assigns elements of A to the constants in L, n-ary operations on A
to the n-place function-symbols of L, and n-place relations over A to
the n-place relation-symbols of L.
We call I an interpretation function. We call L the signature of A.
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Definitions of the second kind: labelling (2) Let L and I be as
above. A model/interpretation/relational structure A for L is an ordered
pair 〈A,I [L]〉, where I [L] is the image of L under I .
As I is a function from L into A ∪ ⋃n∈N+ AAn ∪ ⋃n∈N+P(An),
I [L] is some non-empty subset of A ∪⋃n∈N+ AAn ∪⋃n∈N+P(An).
The difference—a difference that has, of course, no real significance for
the practice of model theory but is nonetheless present right in the very char-
acterization of model theory’s objects of study!—is this: for some authors
a model comprises a domain A and a function from a language/signature
into the set A ∪⋃n∈N+ AAn ∪⋃n∈N+P(An); for others it is the domain
together with the image of the language/signature under such a function.
Often enough the distinction is collapsed notationally: while a model is said
to comprise a domain and function, it is written out as a domain together
with the image of the language/signature under that function. For example,
Annalisa Marcja and Carlo Toffalori tell us
A structure A for L is a pair consisting of a non empty set A,
called the universe of A, and a function mapping
(i) every constant c of L into an element cA of A,
and, for any positive integer n,
(ii) every n-ary function symbol f of L into an n-ary opera-
tion fA of A (hence a function from An into A),
(iii) every n-ary relation symbol R of L into an n-ary relation
RA of A (hence a subset of An).
The structure A is usually denoted as follows
A = (A, (cA)c∈L, (fA)f∈L, (RA)R∈L).
(Marcja & Toffalori, 2003, p. 2)3
Chang and Keisler, more careful than most, distinguish between a model
and its “displayed form” (Chang & Keisler, 1990, p. 20).
3(cA)c∈L, (fA)f∈L, and (RA)R∈L are indexed families (or indexed sets). On some
accounts, indexed families are functions (with the indexing set as domain and the set of indexed
elements as the range). But Sacks is clear that, e.g., {cAk |k ∈ K} in his notation is a subset
of the domain A (Sacks, 1972, p. 8) and Hodges is likewise so (Hodges, 1993, p. 2, Hodges,
1997, p. 2). Moreover, what would be the point of replacing one function with three?
We should note that there are two ways to think of an indexed family such as (cA)c∈L. One
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Definitions of the third kind: indexing A (similarity) type or signature
is a quintuple 〈I, J,K, µ, ν〉 such that µ : J → N and ν : K → N.
A model/relational structure A of signature/type 〈I, J,K, µ, ν〉 consists
of
◦ a non-empty set A;
◦ for each i ∈ I , an element cAi of A;
◦ for each j ∈ J , a µ(j)-ary operation fAj defined on A;
◦ for each k ∈ K, a ν(k)-place relation RAk defined over A.
The sets I , J and K index the distinguished individuals, functions and re-
lations in the model, respectively. We can again think of there being an
interpretation function, or, better, three interpretation functions, from the
indexing sets into A,
⋃
n∈N+ A
An , and
⋃
n∈N+P(A
n), respectively.
Gerald Sacks (Saturated Model Theory) takes the signature/type to be
the quintuple; María Manzano (Model Theory) takes it to be just 〈µ, ν〉—
she takes individuals to be functions of zero arguments but notes that we
could distinguish them from functions.
We have a 2 × 2 classification of what structures/models are said to
be: they divide on whether the signature σ is the non-logical vocabulary
L of a language L or comprises arbitrary indexing sets and on whether
the second component of a model is an interpretation function I or the
image of the signature under that function I [σ]. In the case of indexing,
the model is given as the images of the two (Manzano) or three (Sacks)
indexing functions; what’s important is that it’s the images, not the functions
themselves, that are constituents of the model. Table 1 encapsulates where
various authors stand.
Here σ is the type or signature. When A = 〈A,I 〉, we have Hodges’
“different language, different structure”. When A = 〈A,I [σ]〉, the same
structure can be specified using different signatures.4
way respects the multiplicity of multiple occurrences, with different indices, of the same item.
This way, we would obtain a multiset. The other is to ignore repetitions, thus taking (cA)c∈L
and its ilk to be sets (as I have in speaking of the image of the signature under the interpretation
function). None of our authors explicitly endorses the multiset reading; some are explicit in
insisting on sets. On multisets, see, e.g., (Hickman, 1980; Blizard, 1989, 1991; Singh, 1994;
Singh, Ibrahim, Yohanna, & Singh, 2007).
4Textbooks on universal algebra mostly fall into the lower right quadrant (e.g. Grätzer,
1979, pp. 8 & 223-4; Cohn, 1981, pp. 48 & 188-9; Denecke & Wismath, 2002, p. 4; Bergman,
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Table 1: What is a structure?
σ = L (labelling) σ 6= L (indexing)
A = 〈A,I 〉
Chang and Keisler 1990
Barwise 1977
Poizat 2000
Marcja and Toffalori 2003
A = 〈A,I [σ]〉
Hodges 1993, 1997
Rothmaler 2000 Bell and Slomson 1969
Marker 2002 Sacks 1972
Prestel and Delzell 2011 Manzano 1999
Tent and Ziegler 2012
The placing of Hodges here may strike the reader as odd given our start-
ing point. What Hodges says is
A structure A is an object with the following four ingredients.
(1.1) A set called the domain of A . . .
(1.2) A set of elements of A called constant elements, each
of which is named by one or more constants. If c is a
constant, we write cA for the constant element named by
c.
(1.3) For each positive integer n, a set of of n-ary rela-
tions . . . each of which is named by one or more n-ary
relation symbols. If R is a relation symbol, we write RA
for the relation named by R.
(1.4) For each positive integer n, a set of of n-ary opera-
tions . . . each of which is named by one or more n-ary
function symbols. If F is a function symbol, we write
FA for the function named by F .
(Hodges, 1993, p. 2, Hodges, 1997, p. 2)
2012, pp. 3-4). A couple speak of symbols and look more like they belong in the bottom left
(e.g. Wechler, 1992, pp. 5-6; Plotkin, 1994, pp. 36-7). I owe to Göran Sundholm the suggestion
to investigate what textbooks in universal algebra say.
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I leave it to the reader to judge the accuracy of my placing.5
5 Homomorphisms
Every one of our authors ties homomorphisms to signatures (types).
Let A and B be two models of the same signature L with domains A
and B respectively, determined by two interpretation functions, I andJ ,
respectively (both with domain L).
A function h : A→ B is a homomorphism from A to B iff
◦ h(I (c)) =J (c), for each constant c in L;
◦ for each 〈a1, a2, . . . , an〉 in A,
h(I (f)(a1, a2, . . . , an)) = J (f)(h(a1), h(a2), . . . , h(an)), for
each n-ary function-symbol f in L;
◦ for each 〈a1, a2, . . . , an〉 in A, if I (R)(a1, a2, . . . , an) then
J (R)(h(a1), h(a2), . . . , h(an)), for each n-place relation-symbol
R in L.
Let A and B be two models of the same signature/type 〈I, J,K, µ, ν〉
with domains A and B respectively.
A function h : A→ B is a homomorphism from A to B iff
◦ h(cAi ) = cBi , for each i in I;
5Hodges defines signatures thus:
The signature of a structure A is specified by giving
the set of constants of A, and, for each n > 0, the set of n-ary
relation symbols and the set of n-ary function symbols of A.
We shall assume that the signature of a structure can be read off uniquely from
the structure.
The symbol L will be used to stand for signatures. Later it will also stand
for languages – think of the signature ofA as a rudimentary language for talking
about A. If A has signature L, we say A is an L-structure. (Hodges, 1993, pp.
4-5; Hodges, 1997, pp. 4-5)
Given that Hodges allows each item—object, n-ary relation, n-ary operation—in a structure
to be named by more than one element of the signature, one might wonder how we read the
signature off the structure. I guess the thought is that in presenting a structure we cannot but
associate the items comprising the structure with elements of a signature/language.
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◦ for each 〈a1, a2, . . . , aµ(j)〉 in A,
h(fAj (a1, a2, . . . , aµ(j))) = f
B
j (h(a1), h(a2), . . . , h(aµ(j))), for
each j in J ;
◦ for each 〈a1, a2, . . . , aν(k)〉 in A, if RAk (a1, a2, . . . , aν(k)) then
RBk (h(a1), h(a2), . . . , h(aν(k))), for each k in K.
6
So even when 〈A,I [σ]〉 = 〈A,J [σ′]〉, the identity function on A can-
not count as a homomorphism unless σ = σ′.
In the intuitive sense, a structure is a set A, its domain, together with
some subset of A ∪ ⋃n∈N+ AAn ∪ ⋃n∈N+P(An) comprising the distin-
guished individuals, functions, and relations. With that in mind, there are
two ways we might go from here. One is to broaden the model-theorist’s
notion of homomorphism to allow homomorphisms between structures in
the formal sense with different signatures. The other is to define a notion
of homomorphism appropriate to structures in the intuitive sense. Although
textbooks in model theory ignore both, it’s fairly clear how to go about get-
ting both.
Firstly, we borrow from Joseph Goguen and Rod Burstall’s theory of in-
stitutions the idea of a signature morphism (Goguen & Burstall, 1992). A
signature morphism is a function between signatures mapping constants to
constants, n-ary function-symbols to n-ary function-symbols, and n-place
relation-symbols to n-place relation-symbols.7 What we’re after is a con-
ception of a homomorphism from a model with signature L to a model
6In their definition of homomorphism, Bell and Slomson (1969, p. 73) strengthen this to an
‘if, and only if’, thus defining what Manzano (1999, p. 24) calls a ‘strong homomorphism’. Cf.
the definitions of monomorphism in (Sacks, 1972, p. 9), where additionally injectivity of h is
required.
7I owe thanks to Roy Dyckhoff for drawing the literature on institutions to my attention.
Although signature morphisms are the essential stepping-stone to where we want to get to
here, Goguen and Burstall’s aims are different; they do not define a notion of homomorphism
between structures with different signatures.
Goguen and Burstall are interested in the categorial structure you get when you put signature
morphisms together with homomorphisms of structures (in the formal sense) for fixed signa-
tures. In particular, if i is a signature morphism from L to L′ then there’s an induced mapping
from the category of models with signature L′ into the category of models with signature L—
notice the reversal of the order. (The morphisms in the categories are the homomorphisms in
the formal sense between structures with the same signature—L′ and L, respectively.)
Given a signature morphism i : L → L′ and a model with domain A and signature L′,
determined by interpretation functionJ , we define the associated model with domain A and
signature L by defining the interpretation function I as follows:
◦ I (c) =J (i(c)), for all constants c in L;
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with signature L′. We can get that by combining our previous definition
of a homomorphism for models of the same signature with a signature mor-
phism.What we get is the following:
h : A → B is a homomorphism from the model A, with domain A, de-
termined by signature L and interpretation function I , to the model B,
with domain B, determined by signature L′ and interpretation functionJ
if there’s a signature morphism i from L to L′ and
◦ h(I (c)) =J (i(c)), for each constant c in L;
◦ for each 〈a1, a2, . . . , an〉 in A,
h(I (f)(a1, a2, . . . , an)) = J (i(f))(h(a1), h(a2), . . . , h(an)), for
each n-ary function-symbol f in L;
◦ for each 〈a1, a2, . . . , an〉 in A, if I (R)(a1, a2, . . . , an) then
J (i(R))(h(a1), h(a2), . . . , h(an)), for each n-place relation-
symbol R in L.8
The guiding thought is that we can have a homomorphism not only be-
tween structures that are labelled by the members of the same signature but
between structures that can be labelled by the members of the same sig-
nature. We can limit attention to the case when the signature morphism is
surjective; indeed, we had better if we are not to lose sight of reducts and
expansions. (Obviously, we can draw up an analogous definition for the case
of structures defined by types. So too in what follows immediately below.)
A structure in the intuitive sense serves as an interpretation of the sig-
nature L if there is an interpretation function I from L onto the set of dis-
tinguished items of the structure. The structure serves as a duplication-free
◦ I (f) =J (i(f)), for all n-ary function-symbols f in L;
◦ I (R) =J (i(R)), for all n-place relation-symbols R in L.
It now turns out that if there’s a homomorphism (in the already defined sense) from the
model with domain A determined by interpretation-functionJ to the model with domain B
determined by interpretation-functionJ ′, both with signatureL′, then the same function from
A toB is a homomorphism from the associated model with domainA and signature L induced
by i to the associated model with domain B and signature L induced by i—and, if you think
about it, that’s obvious.
8For a strong homomorphism from A into B we require that the last clause be tightened to
an ‘if and only if’ (Manzano, 1999, p. 24; Rothmaler, 2000, p. 5); for an embedding (monomor-
phism) of A into B we require further that h be injective. For an isomorphism we require,
additionally, that it be surjective.
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interpretation if I is a bijection. We can then say: there is a homomor-
phism from the structure with domain A to the structure with domain B
if (i) they serve as duplication-free interpretations of the same signature L
(under the interpretation functions I and J , respectively) and (ii) there
is a homomorphism from the structure in the formal sense with domain A,
determined by L and I , into the structure in the formal sense with domain
B, determined by L andJ .
(Given a domain A, let S be some subset of A ∪ ⋃n∈N+ AAn ∪⋃
n∈N+P(A
n). If we follow the lead Hodges ascribes to Anatoliı˘
Ivanovich Mal’tsev, the existence of a language for which 〈A,S〉 serves as a
duplication-free interpretation is trivial: we take S itself to be the language,
its elements naming themselves autonymously.)
6 The needs of model theory
A structure comprises a domain and a set of distinguished items (individuals,
operations, relations). In order to distinguish those distinguished items, we
need to use labelling or indexing (or something like that). So we naturally
associate labels or indices with the distinguished items in a structure. What
we shouldn’t do—and, as we’ve seen, the majority of model-theory texts do
not—is to take the labelling/indexing to be a feature of the structure. (Chang
& Keisler, 1990, Barwise, 1977, Poizat, 2000, Marcja & Toffalori, 2003 are
the exceptions.)
When we consider homomorphisms between structures, we need to in-
dicate which individual/operation/relation in one structure matches up with
which individual/operation/relation in the other. Using a common labelling/
indexing is an easy way to spell that out. So the way model-theorists pro-
ceed is entirely natural. The problem then is this: if we leave matters this
way, this ties our notion of homomorphism to a shared labelling and it is this
that is at odds with the “pre-theoretical”, ordinary, working mathematician’s
notion of a homomorphism between structures. As we saw, what should be
one structure turns into a family of non-isomorphic structures when pre-
sented under different labellings/indexings.
Despite the central role languages play in model theory, model-theorists
are not interested in particular languages (not in the way field linguists
are); they are interested in classes of languages, languages in which cer-
tain kinds of thing can be said, distinctions drawn, and the like, and the
relations of (classes of) languages to their interpretations. Now, any struc-
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ture (in the intuitive sense) that serves as an interpretation of a signature L,
serves equally as an interpretation of any other signature in which the vari-
ous grammatical categories—constants, n-place function-symbols, n-place
relation-symbols—have the same cardinalities. At least some of the time,
this is what model-theorists have in mind. But model-theorists cannot make
do with classes of languages distinguished solely by the cardinalities of their
grammatical categories. Sometimes they start with models of one language
then consider interpretations of expansions of that language. Expanding
a language needn’t change the cardinalities of its grammatical categories.
Nevertheless, a distinction needs to be made between the original language
and its expansion(s). And an interpretation of an expansion is exactly that: it
is not usefully to be thought of as an interpretation of the original language.
The model-theorist cannot—or, at the very least, cannot without a good
deal of unedifying, pointlessly pedantic, faffing about—reduce the iden-
tification of languages to the cardinalities of the categories of their non-
logical vocabulary. Such an identification is all that’s needed in determin-
ing whether a structure can serve as an interpretation of a language and for
spelling out a sensible notion of homomorphism. But in practice it won’t do
for all model theory’s purposes. Consequently, the model theorist ends up
speaking as though she does have particular languages in mind (even though
she really doesn’t).
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